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ABSTRACT 
Steganography has long been regarded as a tool used for illicit and destructive 
purposes such as crime and warfare. Currently, digital tools are widely available to 
ordinary computer users also. Steganography software allows both illicit and 
legitimate users to hide messages so that they will not be detected in transit. This 
article provides a brief history of steganography, discusses the current status in the 
computer age, and relates this to forensic, security, and legal issues. The paper 
concludes with recommendations for digital forensics investigators, IT staff, 
individual users, and other stakeholders. 
Keywords: steganography, data hiding, information hiding, digital forensics, 
computer law, computer security, steganalysis, privacy 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Steganography is the process of hiding information. In the digital realm, 
steganography (which literally means “covered writing”), involves hiding data or 
messages in digital files. The files themselves may appear to be innocuous, and 
would be ignored by a casual observer or even by authorities. The field of 
information hiding has grown sufficiently in recent years.  Evidence of this growth 
can be seen at workshops on information hiding, and in occasional reports of use 
by criminals and terrorists appear in the popular press. In contrast to cryptography 
where the message is encoded, the purpose of steganography is to hide the fact that 
a message is being sent. Once encoded, a cryptographically altered message 
typically appears unrecognizable and would raise suspicions.  The primary 
advantage of steganography over cryptography is that the “covertext” (apparent 
messages) do not attract attention to themselves, to messengers, or to recipients. 
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Modern information technology enables novice computer users to hide, transmit, 
and unhide steganographic messages without special expertise. (Warkentin, et al, 
2006)  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: A brief history (Section 
2) is followed by an introduction to steganography (3), with contrasts to 
encryption, and an introduction to steganalysis (4).  The following three sections 
focus on forensics issues (5), security issues (6), and legal issues (7).  Section 8 has 
conclusions and recommendations for researchers and practitioners. 
2. BRIEF HISTORY 
2.1 Ancient Greece and Rome 
Steganography has a long history, going back to the ancient Greek and Roman 
civilizations. Herodotus, the Greek historian, reports how king Darius shaved the 
head of a prisoner and wrote a secret message on his scalp. After the hair grew 
back, the prisoner was sent to the king’s son-in-law Aristogoras in Miletus and 
effectively delivering the message undetected by the enemy. A less time-
consuming method of delivering secret messages was used by a soldier named 
Demeratus who needed to send a message to Sparta that king Xerxes planned to 
invade Greece. Demeratus removed the wax from a writing tablet, wrote the 
message on the underlying wood, and re-applied the wax. Both examples explain 
why the word steganography is based on the Greek word for “covered writing” 
(steganos = unseen or hidden; graphia = writing): protection of the message is 
assured not through making the message undecipherable, but by hiding the 
existence of the message altogether. Sending undecipherable messages is the 
technique of cryptography (kryptos = hidden or secret), and both techniques are 
often used in conjunction. The Romans accomplished the goal of sending 
messages undetected by writing between the lines of innocuous documents with 
invisible ink made from fluids like milk, urine and fruit juices. When the document 
was heated, the invisible ink would darken and become visible. 
2.2 Middle Ages 
At the end of the Middle Ages, two authors produced seminal works on 
steganography. Johannes Trithemius (1462-1526) wrote the three volumes of 
Steganographia (ca. 1499) which superficially describe black magic, specifically 
using spirits to communicate over long distances.  However, by deciphering the 
text with a simple substitution method, one can read treatises on both cryptography 
and steganography.  More than a century later, Gaspari Schotti picked up where 
Trithemius left off and published Steganographia (1665), which focuses on 
techniques with text, invisible inks, and incorporating hidden messages in music.  
2.3 More Recent History 
In the mid 19th century, a global technology revolution dramatically altered 
information transmission speed so that what took days or weeks to convey (at the 
speed of ships and horses) could be achieved in minutes with the new telegraph.  
Almost immediately, businesses and individuals sought to conceal their true 
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message from telegraph operators, especially when the messages might be 
sensitive or might convey strategic business information.  Some messages were 
simply enciphered, but others were creatively disguised using various 
steganographic schemes to prevent telegraph operators from becoming suspicious. 
(Standage, 1999) 
In the late 19th century, Lord Baden-Powell was employed as a scout by the 
British army. To hide his drawings of positions of Boer artillery bases, he hid maps 
in drawings of butterflies. Certain markings on the wings of the butterflies were 
actually enemy installation positions. Thus, he would not be suspected even if he 
were caught. Hiding messages was further perfected by the German invention of 
the microdot, where photographs the size of printed periods contain images of 
standard size pages. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover labeled this as “the enemy’s 
masterpiece of espionage.” Other advancements during World War I included the 
advent of null ciphers, where unencrypted messages about ordinary events contain 
hidden messages. For instance, the following message sent by the German 
embassy in Washington, DC, to their headquarters in Berlin “Apparently neutral's 
protest is thoroughly discounted and ignored. Isman hard hit. Blockade issue 
affects pretext for embargo on by-products, ejecting suets and vegetable oils” can 
be decoded by taking the second letter of each word, and results in “Pershing sails 
from NY June 1”. (Kahn, 1996) As evidenced by comparing the message sizes, 
this technique was relatively inefficient. Additionally, some of these messages are 
nonsensical, and therefore may raise suspicions.   
2.4 Computer Age 
The advent of the digital computer has introduced new opportunities for hiding 
messages, but also new challenges for forensic investigation. International 
workshops on information hiding and steganography have been held regularly 
since 1996 (Moulin and O’Sullivan, 2003), however, the majority of development 
and use of computerized steganography has occurred since 2000 (Cole, 2003). The 
use of steganography is now well within the reach of an average person with a 
computer and an Internet connection (Bartlett, 2003), and the most recent 
development is the potential use of steganography in Internet Telephony systems 
such as Skype (Mazurczyk and Szczypiorski, 2008). 
3. DIGITAL STEGANOGRAPHY 
3.1 Definitions 
In the modern computer age, technology has enabled the embedding of hidden 
messages efficiently and easily. Computerized tools encode the message and hide 
it within another file. Johnson (2008) defines steganography as “the art of 
concealing the existence of information within seemingly innocuous carriers” and 
adds that “an encrypted message may draw suspicion while a hidden message will 
not.” Thus, the goal is to conceal that the fact that the message even exists in the 
first place (Anderson and Petitcolas, 1998), so that anyone intercepting and 
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viewing the file (image, document, e-mail, etc.) would not be readily aware of the 
hidden bits. In the 1996 Information Hiding Workshop in Cambridge (Pfitzmann, 
1996), the following terminology in steganography was defined. The embedded 
data is the information to be hidden in the cover, the original, innocent file such as 
an image, audio, text, or video. The process itself is labeled embedding, and the 
cover and embedded data together form the stego data. 
As mentioned earlier, both steganography and cryptography intend to hide 
information. Steganography hides the existence of the message, cryptography 
makes the message impossible to understand for outsiders, and both are often used 
together. Whereas cryptographic messages by themselves are easily identifiable by 
their random and unintelligible appearance, steganography messages appear to be 
normal at first sight. The combined use of steganography and cryptography can 
effectively provide a message sender two levels of protection. 
Another related technology is watermarking, where digital files are visibly or 
invisibly marked with embedded information. For the sake of completeness, we 
will briefly discuss some cryptographic definitions and principles as they relate to 
steganography, compare steganography and watermarking, and focus the 
remainder of the paper only on steganography and related issues.  
The classical principles of cryptography were defined by the Dutch linguist 
Auguste Kerckhoff (1883) as: 
? the system should be, if not theoretically unbreakable, unbreakable in 
practice, 
?  the design of a system should not require secrecy, 
? compromise of the system should not inconvenience the 
correspondents, 
? the key should be memorable without notes and should be easily 
changeable, 
? the cryptograms should be transmittable by telegraph, 
? the apparatus or documents should be portable and operable by a 
single person, and 
? the system should be easy, theater requiring knowledge of a long list 
of rules nor involving mental strain. 
Clearly, some of these principles still apply today. Like steganography, 
cryptography has significantly improved both in use and in decryption since the 
advent of the modern computer. Ciphers are more complex, and any type of data 
can be converted in binary format. Separately and in combination, the techniques 
have been of great interest to the intelligence and law enforcement communities. 
We will address some of these issues in a later section. 
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In watermarking, the object of the communication is not in the embedded message 
but in the carrier itself. The watermark only serves to uniquely identify the carrier. 
This can be overt as a deterrent to digital copying, or hidden as proof of ownership 
and origin. Television broadcast companies routinely include a visible watermark 
in their programming, and copyright protection systems use invisible watermarks. 
This indicates the need for inseparability of watermark and carrier, since removal 
of the (visible or invisible) watermark destroys the deterrence to copying and proof 
of ownership. A special problem for both steganography and watermarking is the 
conversion of digital files to different formats or with different compression levels. 
Both can affect the embedded information, and the technology needs to be robust 
against this type of attack and signal modification.  For example, only lossless 
compression algorithms (e.g. GIF, not JPEG) are appropriate for steganographic 
concealment, because the embedded data may become altered otherwise.  Certain 
transmission protocols may also compress the signal in ways that could 
compromise the ability to discover the embedded data by the recipient. Finally, 
whereas steganographic content can lose significance when information becomes 
outdated or stale, watermarks retain their significance indefinitely. A brief 
comparison of the three technologies is included as Table 1. 
Table 1: Comparison of Steganography, Cryptography, and 
Watermarking 
Technique Purpose Comments 
Steganography Hiding existence of digital 
content from outsiders 
Content generally of 
limited time value. 
Needs carrier file 
Cryptography Rendering the digital content  
inaccessible to outsiders 
Content generally of 
limited time value. 
No need for carrier file 
Watermarking Protection of digital content 
of carrier 
May or may not be 
readily detectable. 
Durability is essential 
 
For the purposes of this paper, the remainder of the discussion will focus only on 
steganography. 
3.2 Types of Steganography 
The hidden content of stego messages can be embedded in the carrier file by three 
types of methods. The stego message can be injected inside the carrier, which does 
not alter the digital content of the carrier itself. Alternatively, part of the digital 
carrier content can be substituted with the stego message. The latter does change 
the digital content of the carrier. A relatively new method of hiding content is to 
use the stego message to generate a completely new file. Examples of each method 
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may serve to clarify how each can be used, or is used, in practice. 
3.2.1 Injection Techniques 
Hiding information in existing files routinely occurs in common computer 
applications. Properties of Microsoft Office documents are automatically recorded 
with information specified – perhaps years earlier – when the Office application 
was installed. The Author property is automatically culled from the User 
Information entry under the Tools/Options menu. Complete safe removal requires 
a special tool (http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/help/HA011400341033.aspx). 
Information Systems conferences and journals now routinely instruct authors how 
to remove identifying information in order not to compromise the blind review 
process. More intentionally, information can be invisibly hidden in Web pages by 
using the “hidden” tag. The regular view of the webpage does not show the 
content, but the source view reveals the <input type="hidden"> tag. Other 
examples include storing data in unused space in file headers, data packets sent 
over networks, and unused disk space (Johnson et al, 2001). Using open space 
without any alteration to the carrier file is very limited in capacity, however. 
Therefore, more modern and secure techniques involve some level of modification 
of the carrier file.  
3.2.2 Substitution Techniques 
In substitution techniques, a limited amount of data of the carrier file is replaced 
with the coded representation of the hidden message. In techniques involving the 
Least Significant Bit (LSB), the binary representation of each picture element 
(pixel) in a graphic file is changed to encode the hidden message. This is done such 
that the effect on the visual image is negligible. Consider the following color 
encoding: 
10010101   00001101   11001001 
10010110   00001111   11001010 
10011111   00010000   11001011 
The LSB algorithm can hide the following nine bits 101101101 by changing the 
last bit in each octet as needed. This results in 
10010101   00001100   11001001 
10010111   00001110   11001011 
10011111   00010000   11001011 
This example demonstrates that to hide nine bits of information, the algorithm only 
needs to change four of the nine least significant bits in these nine bytes.  Because 
changing the last bit causes an extremely small change in the color of a pixel, the 
change in the graphic is imperceptible to the human eye.  For a more detailed 
description of this process, the reader can visit: 
http://www.garykessler.net/library/steganography.html. More complex algorithms 
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include Discrete Cosine Transformation (DCT), Fourier transformations, and the 
Patchwork Method of Bender. In audio files, techniques for information hiding 
include replacing the phases of short segments imperceptibly with reference phases 
representing the hidden data (phase coding), spreading a narrow band signal of the 
message over a wide spectrum of frequencies making it appear as random noise 
(spread spectrum encoding), dividing the bandwidth of the carrier into multiple 
channels and hopping between these channels (frequency hopping), and many 
others.  
3.2.3 File Creation 
Finally, the stego message can be used to generate a completely new, innocent-
looking file. In essence, the message creates its own carrier. An example of this 
technique is the application SpamMimic (http://spammimic.com/ ). Using 
SpamMimic, a short message can easily be hiding in text that appears to be spam.  
This message then can be send to someone who would then use the website to 
decode the message.  An advantage of this is that few people would be suspicious 
of spam messages.  The technique is relatively inefficient, as evidenced by the 
conversion of the three words “steganography is interesting” to text with a word 
count of 574.  Full sentences easily balloon to emails with thousands of words.  
However, given the advantages of such a method, the word count may be of little 
consequence. 
3.3 Steganography Encryption Levels 
Techniques of steganography can also be distinguished by the level of encryption. 
The least secure level, which does not require the exchange of a cipher such as a 
stego key, is pure steganography. Effectiveness of keeping the stego message 
secure relies only on the ability of the message to remain undetected. Using a 
secret stego key prior to communication makes the message more secure, but can 
also raise suspicions because exchange of the secret stego key must precede the 
transmission of the carrier with the stego message. Consequently, there is a trade-
off between probability of detection on one hand, and the security of the embedded 
message if detected. The most secure technique uses a private and a public key to 
secure the message embedded in the carrier. The stego message is embedded with 
the use of a public key, and the message extracted with a private key. As in public 
key encryption, there is no need to exchange keys and therefore the risk of 
detection is not increased. It must also be emphasized that the keys in secret key 
steganography and public key steganography only serve to augment the execution 
of the steganography application, and do not constitute the use of encryption. 
A summary of steganography techniques is included as Table 2. 
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Table 2: Steganography Techniques 
Technique Method Effect on carrier 
file 
Comments 
Injection 
techniques 
Using built-in 
information 
recording tools or 
“open” file space 
No change of 
content 
Very limited 
hiding capacity 
Substitution 
techniques 
Part of digital 
content of carrier 
file changed to 
reflect stego 
message 
Some 
degradation of 
content quality 
Increased risk of 
detection with 
increasing 
volume of stego 
content 
File creation Stego message 
hidden in larger 
amount of new, 
irrelevant digital 
content 
None- new 
carrier file 
created 
Inefficient, 
detection risk 
highly dependent 
on context of 
message 
Stego encryption Stego content is 
encrypted as it is 
included in 
carrier file 
Nome beyond 
pure 
steganography 
Key exchange 
increases risk 
detection 
 
3.4 File types 
Finally, steganography can use different types of files. Until recently, mostly 
audiovisual files were used as carrier files for inclusion of stego content. These 
files are generally large and have a large image hiding capacity. For instance, the 
color of a pixel in an icon can be changed imperceptibly by minimally changing 
the digital color code (e.g. from 01011011 01010011 01011001 to 01011010 
01010011 01011001), whereas changing a single character in the word 'fat' to 'bat' 
is not only noticeable, but also changes the entire meaning of the word. 
Incidentally, both are represented by three bytes.  As steganography is increasingly 
seen as a useful business tool, other file types are now being used as cover files. An 
example is the use of steganography for placing identifiers in database 
relationships (Agrawal et al, 2003).  
4. STEGANALYSIS: DETECTION OF STEGANOGRAPHY: 
4.1 Steganalysis 
Just as digital technology can be used to hide messages, can it be used to detect and 
decode stego messages. Steganalysis is the process of hunting for small deviations 
in the expected patterns of a file (Cohen, 2001), so that the presence of hidden 
messages can be detected. Steganalysis and steganography are two sides of the 
same coin, similar to cryptography and cryptanalysis, and computer viruses and 
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antivirus software. Research in steganography involves both developing new 
techniques for hiding content and developing new tools for detection and 
deciphering of hidden content. This duality is similar to biologic warfare, where 
development of new biological weapons goes hand in hand with research of their 
antidotes.  
4.2 Types of Steganalysis 
Based on knowledge of the actual message, availability of the original cover file, 
steganography tool, the following types of steganalysis can be distinguished 
(Petitcolas, 2000):  
? Stego only attack - only the stego object is available for analysis;   
? Known cover attack - the cover and the stego object are both 
available;  
? Known message attack - the message is known and can be compared 
with the stego object;  
? Chosen stego attack - the stego object and the stego tool (algorithm) 
are available for analysis;  
? Chosen message attack - choose a regular message, convert to stego 
message for further analysis;  
? Known stego attack - the stego message, the stego tool (algorithm), 
and the cover message are all available for analysis.  
In general, steganalysis becomes more efficient and effective as more elements are 
known. A further level of complexity is introduced as steganalysis moves from 
detection only, to detection and deciphering of the stego message. 
4.3 Detection Vectors 
Detection of steganography can be based on comparisons of the stego file and the 
original file, detection of files having larger than expected file sizes, and variation 
in statistical properties of the digital information in the files. Original files are often 
not available, unless they come from public sources. However, many 
steganography techniques increase the size of the digital carrier file, to the point 
that is becomes statistically significant. Moreover, as the structure of the stego 
message is superimposed on the digital carrier data, analysis of distribution of 
known properties often reveals the presence of the hidden message. For instance, 
bitmap files with more than 50 near-identical colors should be suspected of 
containing hidden messages (Petitcolas, 2000). 
4.4 Destruction vs. Deciphering 
Finally, deciphering of stego messages is not always necessary. If the hidden 
message can be destroyed before it reaches its destination, the attempt at hidden 
communication has effectively been thwarted. Graphical files can be altered by 
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changing file formats, compression algorithms, and compression levels, usually 
without noticeable visible impact on the integrity of the carrier file.  
In summary, the detection and deciphering of steganographic content is 
complicated and has many challenges. Nevertheless, it is a subject that the security 
and legal communities cannot ignore. 
5. DIGITAL FORENSICS ISSUES 
5.1 Digital Forensics 
Digital forensics focuses on the preservation and analysis of digital evidence. As 
defined in Palmer (2008), digital forensics are “the use of scientifically derived and 
proven methods toward the preservation, collection, validation, identification, 
analysis, interpretation, documentation, and presentation of digital evidence 
derived from digital sources for the purpose of facilitation or furthering the 
reconstruction of events found to be criminal, or helping to anticipate unauthorized 
actions shown to be disruptive to planned operations.”  As steganography becomes 
more widely available and the amount of data on local machines and Internet 
increases, the issue of detection of the use of steganography by digital forensics 
personnel becomes increasingly important.  In theory, this should be evaluated in 
any type of case involving computer use. In practice, most cases will involve 
audiovisual files, such as in child pornography. However, cases of industrial 
espionage and fraud could be encountered. 
5.2 Approaches in Forensic Steganalysis 
Digital Forensic experts employ many techniques, and we will limit the discussion 
to those applicable to steganography and steganalysis. 
5.2.1 Detection of software 
In some cases, steganography software itself may be discovered on computer 
equipment under investigation. The Steganography Application Fingerprint 
Database (SAFDB) currently contains identifying information on 625 applications 
associated with steganography, watermarking, and other data-hiding applications 
(Backbone Security, 2008a). Similarly, the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) maintains a list of digital signatures in the National Software 
Reference Library, some of which are for steganography software. Even when 
software has been removed, traces can sometimes be found in places like the 
Windows registry or in system backup files. When steganography software 
installation has been identified, malicious intent should be assumed until proven 
otherwise. 
5.2.2 Detecting pairs of carrier files and stego files 
In addition to detecting the software used for steganography, digital forensics 
experts can detect files with similar visual properties but different file sizes, hash 
values, and statistical properties. If files have been deleted, they may be retrieved 
from the Recycle Bin or similar Trash container, or even reconstructed with special 
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forensics tools for file recovery.  
5.2.3 Using Keywords 
An additional method of detection uses a list of keywords to search for file names 
and content in program files and data files. The list should be specific with regard 
to steganography. For instance, the search term “steg*” can be used to identify 
steganography. The effectiveness and efficiency in detection, while preventing 
false positives and false negatives, depends on the quality of the keyword 
dictionary. 
5.2.4 Specialized Steganalysis Software 
In the past, most steganography detection tools targeted specific applications – 
frequently the same applications used for steganography. More recent software 
claims to detect stego files created with a wide variety of programs. One of these is 
Stegdetect 0.6, which uses linear discriminant analysis to locate probable images 
with hidden content by comparing them with a set of normal images (Provos, 
2008). A second common tool is Stego Suite (Wetstone Technologies, 2008), 
which combines increasingly intense levels of detection with content cracking 
tools.  The third example is the recent release of StegAnalyzerAS (Backbone 
Security, 2008b), which uses the values stored in the SAFDB to identify potential 
stego files. A comprehensive list of steganography tools is maintained at 
http://www.jjtc.com/Steganography/tools.html.  
5.2.5 Physical crime scene investigation 
Finally, physical crime scene investigation can reveal useful information. 
Passwords used for steganography tools can be written on notes stuck under 
keyboards, and environmental objects can generate clues about potential 
passwords.  
6. DIGITAL SECURITY ISSUES 
Though steganography tools may be used for legitimate business applications such 
as protecting strategic corporate information during transmission (Schmidt et al, 
2004), they have emerged as a significant issue to forensic investigators and others 
who are concerned with malicious and illegal uses. As steganography tools 
become more widely available and easier to use, protection against malicious use 
demands attention, and the balance between protection from illicit use and 
interference with legitimate use emerges as a new challenge. In this section, we 
will focus on protection against malicious use, and not discuss specific potential 
business applications such as watermarking for protection of intellectual property 
(discussed above). 
6.1 Prevention of Malicious Use 
Organizations fight a continuous battle for control over the user desktop. 
Employees install unapproved applications such as Instant Messaging clients, 
screen savers, and peer-to-peer software if given the opportunity. Likewise, 
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employees could install steganography software from repositories such as 
JTTC.com (Johnson, 2008). The first lines of defense against these practices are –
as for any unapproved software – company policies and limiting user permissions. 
Acceptable use policies should explicitly exclude steganography software, since 
users could argue that it does not fall under banned software due to some 
legitimate uses.   
6.2 Detection of Unauthorized Steganography Software 
Unfortunately, not all employees abide by company policy and some are able to 
circumvent restricted user permissions. The following measures should be 
considered: 
? Use of network intrusion software to detect abnormal movement of 
graphics files. Most business practices do not involve a high level of 
graphics file use, and most traffic will be incoming as a result of web 
surfing. Outgoing graphics files, whether in isolation or as email 
attachments, should be scanned. 
? Since stego files will not be detected unless they are sought, automatic 
scanning of networked computers should be considered. This can be 
done with a variety of commercial steganalysis software. 
? Finally, computers brought in for maintenance or repair should be 
routinely scanned for steganography as well as computer viruses and 
malware.  
Together, these measures will contribute to active identification of illicit 
steganography use in the enterprise. 
6.3 Steganography as an Organizational Priority 
Steganography is but one threat to the security of the enterprise. As with other 
security threats (e.g., computer viruses and network intrusion), prevention and 
allocation of resources will depend on the perceived relative importance of the 
threat. Wingate (2007) describes four typical stakeholder responses: 
? unaware of the threat. Steganography is typically confused with 
shorthand writing (stenography). 
? denial of the threat. Even some experts fall in this category, as 
evidenced by the statement made by Neils Provos to the press: 
“Steganography becomes the focus of attention, dies down, and then 
the public is all over it again, … But it will never be pervasive, 
because the amount of data you can actually hide in the images is 
fairly small. And if someone wanted to steal intellectual property, it’d 
be easier to copy the data on a disk and carry it out in your pocket.” 
(Radcliff, 2002). 
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? resignation. Stakeholders typically state that nothing can be done 
about steganography due to a lack of good tools for detection and 
information extraction. 
? perception of steganography as a legitimate threat. Wingate (2007) 
falls in this category: “A comprehensive enterprise security program 
should include countermeasures to the threat posed by insider use of 
steganograhpy. The first step is to acknowledge the threat exists by 
developing and implementing policy to prohibit users from having 
steganography applications on their workstations. Finally, both 
passive and active detection tools and techniques should be employed 
to enforce the ‘no steg policy.’” 
Users are encouraged to form their own opinion about the relevance and extent of 
the threat of steganography. 
7. LEGAL ISSUES AND CHALLENGES  
Laws involving technology are difficult to enact and even more difficult to enforce 
in the Internet age. Many Internet communications cross state lines and 
international borders, which creates the issue of jurisdiction. What may be illegal 
in one jurisdiction may be legal in another. In 1952, the United States enacted 
Section 1343 of the Federal Criminal Code. It included a wire fraud provision, 
which was later extended to encompass the Internet. Using any part of the 
telecommunications system in a criminal act is now a federal offense (Cole, 2003).  
Court orders must be obtained from a judge to monitor phone conversations, but 
the order applies to a specific phone number only. Criminals can easily bypass this 
by using disposable cell phones (Charny, 2003). Other new technologies, such as 
the voice over Internet protocol (VoIP), pose new challenges. Internet Telephony 
breaks phone conversations into data packets, sends them over the Internet, and 
reassembles them at the destination. To monitor this traffic, a few central locations 
would have to be set up where voice streams could be diverted and then be copied 
before resending them to the intended destination (Wired News, 2003). It would be 
much more effective to monitor right after the starting point when packets are not 
separated over different routes or right before the destination, when all packets 
follow a single path.  
7.1 Privacy vs. Security 
A delicate balance exists between loss of personal privacy and the greater good of 
society. Groups like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) are opposing law 
enforcement monitoring of communications. The ACLU’s position on privacy and 
technology is that the United States is at risk of becoming a surveillance society. 
Two concurrent developments form the basis for this trend (American Civil 
Liberties Union, 2003):  
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? The tremendous explosion in surveillance-enabling technologies. 
George Orwell’s vision of ‘Big Brother’ has now become 
technologically possible. 
? Even as this technological surveillance monster grows in our midst, 
we are [weakening] the legal restraints that keep it from trampling our 
privacy. 
Another problem is the risk of unintended consequences of any new legislation. 
For example, a Michigan state law enacted March 31, 2003, based on the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and originally intended to protect cable TV 
operators and broadband providers, contained the provision “A person shall not 
assemble, develop, manufacture, possess, deliver, or use any type 
telecommunications access device by doing, but not limited to, any of the 
following: ... (b) Conceal the existence or place of origin or destination of any 
telecommunications service” (Act 328 of 1931, 2004). The law had to be amended 
in 2004 because in its original form, the legitimate use of technologies, such as 
steganography, was clearly prohibited. Likewise, some information gathered by 
authorities could be used for illegitimate purposes.  
Recently, the U.S. government has tried to gain more access to communications 
and restrict the use of encryption technology. Similar to the Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA) in the United States, the 
European Parliament implemented the Communications Data Protection Directive 
in 2003. European member states can order telecommunications companies to 
store all electronic communications, including phone calls, e-mails, and Internet 
use, for indefinite periods. In general though, the European Union is more 
permissive with regard to specific technologies to hide data. Neither the United 
States nor the European Union has enacted laws restricting the use of 
steganography specifically, and it is unlikely that legal restrictions on the use of 
steganography will be implemented. Laws restricting the use of cryptography have 
existed for years (Koops, 2007), while legal limits on the use of steganography 
have yet to be implemented. Moreover, the potential thwarting of criminal 
activities may not outweigh the loss of privacy. 
7.2 International Travel 
Finally, though steganography may not be illegal, even the possession could be 
cause for alarm in some parts of the world. International travelers, including 
business travelers, should realize that unhidden coded messages, no matter how 
unbreakable, will arouse suspicion and may in themselves be incriminating in 
countries where encryption is illegal. If hidden digital messages would be found, 
the owner of the equipment could be in similar legal trouble abroad. The 
possession and use of steganography should therefore be considered very carefully.  
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8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Steganography has a long history of both legitimate and illicit uses (Schmidt et 
al, 2004). With rapid development and improvements of information 
technology, the potential for use and abuse will continue to increase. Some 
legitimate uses exist, but the focus has been predominantly on detection of 
abuse and illicit use. 
Legal restrictions are difficult to enforce, therefore Information Technology 
(IT) staff charged with organizational security should act proactively by 
seeking management support to limit or banish use of steganography that has 
no distinct organizational benefit. The specifics of the limitations should be 
incorporated as an integral part of the organizational policies and procedures, 
and should be actively enforced. If a ban on all steganographic software is not 
possible or desirable, specific exceptions of applications, individuals, and/or 
job categories allowed to use the software should be explicitly specified. To 
foster active prevention, managers must establish organizational policies which 
discourage or ban the use of steganography.  Furthermore, these policies must 
be instantiated with specific procedures and guidelines that are communicated 
to all employees and other stakeholders during initial and ongoing routine 
Security Awareness, Training, and Education (SATA) programs.  Compliance 
with these policies and procedures must be actively enforced as part of the 
organizational IT governance mechanisms. Networked computers can be 
actively scanned for steganographic software, similar to scanning for computer 
malware infections and scanning for proper software versions and patches. 
Network traffic can be scanned as it enters and leaves the organizational 
network boundaries, similar to scanning for email security threats. Finally, 
Technical Support staff can be instructed in identification of banned software, 
as well as the proper organizational procedures when it is found.  
In cases of steganography uses in crimes or organizational espionage, where 
law enforcement investigators or organizational IT staff members 
(respectively) may lack the specific expertise, managers should consider 
bringing in the expertise of digital forensics professionals.  Recommendations 
for specific steganalysis tools are likely to become rapidly stale as technology 
progresses, but a good starting point for selecting the proper tools could be to 
start with the major commercial steganalysis vendors in combination with the 
information in the Steganography Application Fingerprint Database and the 
National Software Reference Library. Together, these sources would provide 
optimal capability to detect and possibly decipher steganographic content. In 
any case, law enforcement and IT staff should consider that steganography 
may have advanced too far to be handled by non-security specialists, and that 
the specialized services of digital forensics professionals may be needed. 
Finally, individual users should consider that the steganography technology has 
advanced well beyond the use by amateur enthusiasts, and that the mere 
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presence of steganographic software on their computers could have serious 
professional and private ramifications. Users should be aware of and stay 
within the restrictions of corporate policies and procedures, as well as legal 
limitations on possession and use of steganography software. When traveling 
abroad with steg software installed, the legal limitations of destination 
countries should be investigated. 
Steganography also presents new challenges for digital forensic investigators, 
security personnel, enterprise managers, law enforcement officials, courts, and 
lawmakers. It will add to the complexity and quantity of the digital forensic 
workload, security measures, and development of case law. Future research of 
steganography and steganalysis should be encouraged for both academics and 
practitioners. 
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